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ABSTRACT	  
	  
This	  paper	  investigates	  the	  formalisation	  process	  of	  small	  and	  medium	  enterprises	  
in	   Vietnam	   using	   data	   from	   SME	   surveys	   in	   2009	   and	   2011.	   To	   capture	   well	   the	  
nature	   of	   informality,	   Multiple	   Correspondence	   Analysis	   is	   applied	   to	   create	   an	  
informality	  index.	  The	  paper,	  then,	  uses	  the	  Cluster	  Analysis	  to	  segment	  firms	  into	  
different	   clusters	   to	   identify	   factors	   associating	   with	   the	   transition	   of	   firms	   from	  
informal	  to	  formal	  status	  and	  vice	  versa.	  The	  results	  find	  that	  informal	  status	  is	  the	  
matter	  of	  no	  choice	  for	  small	  and	  vulnerable	  businesses.	  Furthermore,	  firms	  moving	  
from	   formal	   to	   informal	   conditions	   are	   either	   weak	   businesses	   that	   have	   no	  
potential	   to	  expand	  or	  strong	  enterprises	  which	  want	  to	  escape	  from	  government	  
regulations.	   Contrarily,	   formal	   firms	   and	   those	   moving	   from	   informal	   to	   formal	  
status	   are	   strong	   and	   younger	   businesses	   that	   achieve	   the	   highest	   technical	   and	  
scale	   efficiencies.	   Formalisation	   associates	   with	   the	   burden	   of	   regulation	  
interventions.	   Findings	   from	   the	   paper	   imply	   that	   the	   Vietnamese	   government	  
should	  provide	  more	  assistance	  to	  weak	  firms	  and	  release	  regulation	  interventions	  
to	  promote	  the	  formalisation.	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  Technical	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Data	  Envelopment	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  Cluster	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I.	  INTRODUCTION	  
	  
Informality	  is	  by	  no	  mean	  a	  new	  phenomenon.	  However,	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  sector	  
has	  divided	  scholars.	  Moser	  (1984)	  argues	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  informal	  sector	  as	  
a	  failure	  of	  the	  macro-­‐economy.	  At	  the	  national	  level,	  informality	  means	  the	  loss	  of	  
taxes	   for	   social	  welfare	   and	  mis-­‐allocation	  of	   resources	   that	   hinder	   the	   economic	  
development	   (see	   Loayza	   1996;	  Dabla-­‐Norris	   and	   Feltenstein	   2005).	   At	   firm	   level,	  
informality	   impedes	   firms	   to	   access	   to	   secure	   property	   rights,	   formal	   contract	  
mechanism,	   financial	  services	   (Levenson	  and	  Maloney,	  1998,	  Maloney	  et	  al.	  2011;	  
Rand	  and	  Torm,	  2012),	  and	  trade	  across	  the	  country	  border	  (Tenev	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  At	  
the	  individual	  level,	  working	  in	  the	  informal	  sector	  implies	  having	  no	  access	  to	  social	  
insurance	  (USAid,	  2005;	  Rand	  and	  Torm,	  2012).	  Thus,	  the	  informal	  sector	  needs	  to	  
be	  formalised	  and	  there	   is	  no	  need	  for	  policy	   interventions.	   If	  any,	   that	  should	  be	  
designed	  to	  clear	  the	  sector	  in	  the	  course	  of	  development.	  
Contrarily,	  other	  economists	  consider	  the	  informal	  sector	  as	  the	  issue	  of	  selection.	  
Harris	  and	  Todaro	  (1970)	  see	  informal	  jobs	  as	  the	  matter	  of	  no	  choice	  where	  people	  
lose	  or	   are	  unable	   to	   find	   jobs	  within	   the	   formal	   sector.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  Hart	  
(1972)	  and	  Maloney	  (1999)	  argue	  that	   informal	  enterprises	  select	   themselves	   into	  
the	   sector	   and	   workers	   sometimes	   prefer	   self-­‐employment	   to	   salaried	   jobs.	  
Although	  not	  identifying	  informal	  jobs	  as	  the	  matter	  of	  selection,	  Cling	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  
confirm	   the	   role	   of	   the	   informal	   sector	   as	   the	   absorption	   of	   labour	   redundancies	  
from	   the	   formal	   economy	   during	   the	   global	   economic	   crisis,	   thus	   contributing	   to	  
poverty	  reductions	  in	  developing	  countries.	  Therefore,	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  sector	  is	  
necessary	  and	  deserves	  to	  policy	  considerations.	  	  
Maloney	  (2004)	  argues	  that	  different	  views	  on	  the	  informality	  can	  be	  compromised	  
by	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  the	  informal	  sector.	  In	  addition,	  we	  find	  
that	  different	  results	  from	  empirical	  studies	  might	  come	  from	  various	  definitions	  of	  
the	  sector.	  Often,	  traditional	  studies	  use	  definitions	  in	  terms	  of	  statistical	  measures.	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For	  instance,	  formality	  is	  defined	  as	  having	  tax	  code	  and/or	  paying	  social	  insurances	  
for	   employees	   or	   and/or	   having	   workers	   greater	   than	   a	   certain	   threshold.	   These	  
definitions	  sometimes	  over-­‐	  or	  under-­‐estimate	  the	  informal	  sector.	  	  
This	   first-­‐ever	   paper	   creates	   the	   informality	   index	   to	   capture	   well	   the	   nature	   of	  
informality	   using	   the	   Multiple	   Correspondence	   Analysis	   (MCA).	   By	   using	   Cluster	  
Analysis	   to	   segment	   firms	   into	   distinct	   clusters	   and	   investigate	   factors	   associated	  
with	  each	  cluster,	   the	  paper	  contributes	   to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  studies	   focusing	  on	  
high	  heterogeneity	  of	  informal	  enterprises	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  
The	  study	  of	  Vietnam	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  because	  Vietnam	  is	  considered	  as	  one	  
of	  the	  country	  with	  high	  level	  of	  informality.	  This	  high	  level	  of	  informality	  continues	  
to	   remain	   together	  with	   recently	   increasing	  debates	  on	  whether	   the	  sector	  needs	  
policy	   interventions.	   Therefore,	   in-­‐depth	   insights	   to	  each	   cluster	  of	   informal	   firms	  
will	  provide	  evidence	  for	  policy	  design.	  	  
The	   paper	   is	   structured	   as	   followed.	   Section	   2	   gives	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   informal	  
sector	   in	   Vietnam.	  Methodology	   and	   data	   description	   are	   provided	   in	   Section	   3.	  
Section	   4	   discusses	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   sector	   and	   factors	   associated	   with	   the	  
transformation	  process	  and	  Section	  5	  concludes.	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II.	  THE	  INFORMAL	  SECTOR	  IN	  VIETNAM	  
Traditionally,	  the	  concept	  of	   'informality'	  refers	  to	  the	  part	  of	  the	  economy	  that	   is	  
not	  accordance	  with	  prescribed	  regulations	  (Portes	  et	  al.,	  1989;	   ILO,	  2002;	  Becker,	  
2004;	   Oviedo,	   2009).	   As	   such,	   informality	  may	   take	  many	   forms	   from	   small-­‐scale	  
companies,	  unregistered	  business	  activities,	  the	  street	  vendors	  to	  large	  companies	  
using	   a	   workforce	  without	   labour	   contracts	   but	   does	   not	   include	   illegal	   activities	  
such	  as	  crimes	  and	  drug	  trafficking.	  Given	  this	  broad	  definition,	  empirical	  studies	  on	  
the	  informal	  sector	  use	  diverse	  applicable	  definitions	  leading	  to	  different	  results.	  
Perhaps,	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  15th	  International	  Conference	  of	  Labour	  Statisticians	  
(ICLS)1starts	  to	  set	  up	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  the	  formal	  and	  informal	  sector.	  To	  
distinguish	   informal	   enterprises,	   the	   15th	   ICLS	   recommends	   using	   the	   following	  
three	  criteria:	  non-­‐registration	  of	  the	  enterprise;	  small	  size	  in	  terms	  of	  employment;	  
and	  non-­‐registration	  of	  the	  employees.	  
Since	  the	  15th	  ICLS	  lets	  the	  cut-­‐point	  of	  firm	  size	  to	  countries,	  various	  thresholds	  are	  
applied	  in	  different	  countries	  such	  as	  five	  laborers	  in	  Central	  American	  (Funkhouser,	  
1996),	  six	  for	  Bolivia,	  Mexico	  and	  Peru	  (Pradhan	  and	  van	  Soest,	  1995;	  Marcoullier	  et	  
al.,	  1997,	  Pradhan	  and	  van	  Soest,	  1997,	  Maloney,	  1999),	  ten	  for	  Kenya	  and	  Nigeria	  
(Livingstone,	  1991;	  Arimah,	  2001),	  and	  twenty	  for	  Sudan	  (Cohen	  and	  House,	  1996).	  
These	   studies	   are	   based	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	  majority	   of	   firms	   under	   the	  
above	  clarified	  sizes	  are	  likely	  not	  to	  comply	  with	  government	  regulations.	  
Studies	  on	  informality	  in	  terms	  of	  employees	  also	  do	  not	  converge	  to	  a	  unanimous	  
agreement.	  According	  to	  Duval-­‐Hernández	  (2006),	   informality	  should	  be	  measured	  
according	   to	   the	   worker’s	   legal	   status	   such	   as	   labour	   contract.	   However,	   such	   a	  
measure	  has	  no	   relevance	   for	   the	  case	  of	   self-­‐employed	  workers	   in	  practice	  since	  
self-­‐employees	   cannot	   contract	   with	   themselves.	   Therefore,	   the	   alternative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 	  International	   Labour	   Office	   (1993).	   15th	   International	   Conference	   of	   Labour	   Statisticians:	  
Highlights	  of	  the	  Conference	  and	  text	  of	  the	  three	  resolutions	  adopted.	  Bulletin	  of	  Labour	  Statistics	  
1993-­‐2,	  IXXXIV.	  Geneva.	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indicator	  of	   informality	  is	  social	  security	  status	  (Merrick,	  1976),	  which	  is	  measured	  
by	  no	  social	  protection	  or	  non-­‐payment	  of	  social	  security	  taxes	  (Portes,	  Blitzner,	  and	  
Curtis,	  1986;	  Marcoullier	  et	  al.,	  1997,	  Maloney,	  1999;	  Saavedra	  and	  Chong,	  1999).	  
Some	   studies	   compare	   the	   sensitivity	   of	   informality	   rates	   to	   firm-­‐size	   and	   non-­‐
payment	   of	   social	   security	   taxes.	   The	   results	   show	   that	   the	   informal	   sector	  
measured	   by	   the	   latter	   criteria	   is	   larger	   than	   that	   estimated	   by	   the	   former	  
(Marcoullier	  et	  al.,	  1997,	  Saavedra	  and	  Chong,	  1999),	  Pisani	  and	  Pagán,	  2004).	  This	  
suggests	  that	  different	  measures	  may	  behave	  diversely.	  
Similar	   to	   other	   countries,	   there	   has	   been	   no	   consensus	   on	   the	   definition	   of	   the	  
informal	  sector	  in	  Vietnam	  leading	  to	  controversy	  measure	  of	  the	  sector's	  size.	  Until	  
2007,	   Razafinfrakoto,	   Cling	   and	   Roubaud	   introduced	   international	   standards	   to	  
measure	  the	  informal	  sector	  and	  informal	  employment	  in	  Vietnam	  (Razafindrakoto	  
et	  al.	  2008).	  In	  accordance	  to	  international	  measures,	  the	  informal	  sector	  is	  defined	  
as	  'all	  private	  unincorporated	  enterprises	  that	  produce	  at	  least	  some	  of	  their	  goods	  
and	   services	   for	   sale	   or	   barter	   do	   not	   register	   and	   engage	   in	   non-­‐agricultural	  
activities'	  (Cling	  et	  al.	  2011:	  5).	  	  
Since	  then,	  the	  above	  definition	  has	  been	  applied	  in	  the	  annual	  Labour	  Force	  Survey	  
(LFS)	  in	  Vietnam.	  Results	  from	  LFS	  show	  that	  the	  informal	  economy	  is	  predominant	  
in	   Vietnam.	   The	   share	   of	   informal	   employment	   is	   around	   70%	   during	   the	   period	  
from	  2007	  to	  2013	  (Table	  1).	  	  
Table	  1.	  Proportion	  of	  informal	  employments	  in	  Vietnam,	  2007-­‐09	  (%)	  
	   2007	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	  
Informal	  sector	   74.4	   70.96	   74.57	   74.48	   70.91	   68.53	  
Formal	  sector	   25.6	   29.04	   25.43	   25.52	   29.09	   31.47	  
Total	  	   100	   100	   100	   100	   100	   100	  
Source:	  Authors'	  calculation	  using	  LFS	  2007-­‐2013	  
	   8	  
The	  characteristics	  of	  the	  Vietnamese	  informal	  sector	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  observed	  
in	   other	   developing	   countries.	   For	   instance,	   informal	   enterprises	   have	   low	  
productivity	  and	  income,	  lack	  of	  funds	  and	  investments	  with	  low	  level	  of	  integration	  
into	   the	   economy.	   In	   terms	   of	   employment,	   informal	   workers	   have	   to	   work	   in	  
unstable	  operation	  and	  working	  conditions.	  	  
As	   informality	   is	  partly	   seen	  as	  a	  weakness	   in	  economic	  development,	   formalising	  
the	   sector	   is	   a	  desirable	   goal	   in	  policy	  designs.	  However,	   the	  degree	  of	   transition	  
depends	  on	  several	  factors.	  Thiam	  (2007)	  states	  that	  the	  transition	  from	  informal	  to	  
formal	   status	   is	   triggered	   through	   incentives	   and	   enabling	   environment	   reforms	  
such	   as	   access	   to	   credit,	   trade	   facilitation,	   formalization	   of	   business	   linkages,	  
making	   costs	   of	   formalization	   worthwhile.	   Moreover,	   (Tenev	   et	   al.,	   2003;	   Dabla-­‐
Norris	   et	   al.,	   2005,	   2008)	   find	   that	   both	   regulation	   burden	   and	   legal	   quality	   are	  
important	   determinants	   of	   informality.	   Other	   researchers	   shows	   that	   formality	  
relates	   to	   tax	   burden	   and/or	   costs	   of	   complying	   with	   regulatory	   requirements	  
(Marcouiller	   and	   Young	   1995,	   Cebula	   1997,	   Friedman	   et	   al.	   2000,	   Azuma	   and	  
Grosman	   2002,	   Giles	   and	   Tedds	   2002,	   Straub,	   2005),	   entry	   costs	   (Auriol	   and	  
Warlters,	   2005),	   labor	   (Friedman	   et	   al.,	   2000,	   Johnson	   et	   al.,	   1997,	   1998,	   2000;	  
Botero	  et	  al.,	  2004),	  and	  financial	  development	  (Straub,	  2005).	  	  
In	   Vietnam,	   the	   interactions	   of	   the	   government	   with	   business	   activities,	   level	   of	  
taxation,	   business	   environment,	   and	   the	   level	   of	   access	   to	   resources	   affect	   the	  
transition	  from	  informal	  to	  formal	  status	  (Tenev	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  Cling	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  find	  
that	   businesses'	   size,	   income,	   and	   professional	   premises	   are	   positively	   and	  
significantly	   correlated	   with	   the	   registration	   decision.	   In	   addition,	   the	   education	  
level	   of	   entrepreneurs	   influences	   their	   behaviour	   of	   working	   under	   regulations.	  
Nevertheless,	   the	   number	   of	   years	   in	   business	   apparently	   has	   no	   impact	   on	  
registration.	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III.	  ANALYTICAL	  FRAMEWORK	  AND	  DATA	  	  
3.1	  Analytical	  framework	  
Because	   informality	   is	   a	   multi-­‐dimensional	   concept	   and	   measured	   by	   several	  
criteria,	  empirical	  studies	  struggle	  to	  match	  the	  definition	  of	  informality	  in	  terms	  of	  
statistical	   measures	   with	   those	   proposed	   by	   ICLS	   and	   ILO.	   Therefore,	   to	   better	  
capture	   the	   nature	   of	   informality,	   the	   paper	   firstly	   uses	   MCA	   to	   construct	   the	  
formality	   index.	   Then,	   it	   applies	   the	   nonparametric	   Data	   Envelopment	   Analysis	  
(DEA)	  to	  measure	  a	  firm	  technical	  and	  scale	  efficiency.	  Those	  efficiencies	  together	  
with	  entrepreneurs	  and	   firms'	   characteristics,	   and	  business	  environment	  are	  used	  
as	   input	  variables	   for	   the	  Cluster	  Analysis	   (CA)	  which	   is	  used	   to	   classify	   firms	   into	  
different	  clusters	  and	  identify	  factors	  associated	  with	  each	  cluster.	  	  
Constructing	  the	  formality	  index	  
Multiple	  Correspondence	  Analysis	  is	  a	  data	  reduction	  technique	  which	  is	  similar	  to	  
Principal	  Component	  Analysis	   (PCA)	  but	  applied	   for	   categorical	  data.	  To	  compress	  
data,	   the	   method	   measures	   associations	   among	   variables	   by	   calculating	   the	   Chi-­‐
square	   distance	   between	   different	   categories	   of	   the	   variables	   and	   between	   the	  
observations	  (Le	  Roux	  and	  Rouanet,	  2004).	  Homogeneity	  between	  observations	  and	  
variables	  are	  then	  maximized	  to	  find	  out	  the	  underlying	  dimensions	  which	  are	  best	  
able	  to	  describe	  the	  central	  oppositions	  in	  the	  data.	  	  
The	  method	  is	  briefly	  explained	  as	  follows.	  We	  have	  an	  n	  x	  m	  data	  matrix	  with	  rows	  
corresponding	   to	   objects	   and	   columns	   to	   variables.	   Assuming	   variable	   j	   that	   has	  
different	   k	   values	   (categories)	   and	   define	   Gj	   as	   the	   n	   x	   kj	   indicator	   matrix	  
corresponding	  to	  this	  variable.	  MCA	  determines	  the	  vector	  yj	  which	  quantifies	  the	  
categories	   of	   each	   of	   the	   variables	   such	   that	   homogeneity	   is	  maximised.	   Let	  Gjyj	  
represents	  a	  single	  quantification	  of	  the	  n	  objects	  induced	  by	  variable	  j.	  MCA	  works	  
with	  p	   simultaneously	  dimensional	  quantifications.	  Let	  call	   these	  kj	  x	  p	  matrices	  Yj	  
the	  multiple	  nominal	  quantifications	  of	  variable	  j.	  Then	  the	  matrices	  GjYj	  	  induce	  m	  
multiple	   quantifications	   of	   the	   objects.	   MCA	   minimises	   the	   loss	   of	   homogeneity	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with	  loss	  function	  which	  is	  determined	  in	  terms	  of	  squared	  deviations	  and	  written	  
as	  follows:	  	  
min𝜎 𝑋,𝑌 = 𝑆𝑆𝑄(𝑋 − 𝐺!!!!! 𝑌!)	   	   	   (1)	  
Solutions	   of	   this	   minimisation	   problem	   produce	   principal	   components	   or	   latent	  
dimensions	  which	  reflect	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  original	   information.	  The	  number	  of	  
retained	  components	   is	  determined	  by	  modified	  eigen	  values.	  As	   in	  PCA,	   the	   first	  
axis	  is	  the	  most	  important	  dimension	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  variance	  accounted	  
for.	  
Measuring	  a	  firm	  performance	  	  
One	  of	   the	   contributions	  of	   this	  paper	   is	   to	  explore	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	  
formalization	   process	   and	   firms’	   technical	   and	   scale	   efficiencies.	   Efficiencies	   are	  
estimated	  using	  a	  popular	  non-­‐parametric	  DEA	  approach.	  The	  method	  firstly	  sets	  up	  
a	   nonparametric	   frontier	  which	   is	   the	   production	   level	   of	   firms	   dominating	   other	  
enterprises	  in	  the	  same	  industry.	  As	  in	  Daraio	  and	  Simar	  (2007),	  we	  set	  up	  the	  DEA	  




where are	  observations	  in	  a	  convex	  hull	  of covering	  unit
.	  
Formula	   (2)	   allows	   the	   variant	   returns	   to	   scale	   production	   technology,	   where	  
outputs	  under	  efficient	  production	  change	  by	  a	  different	  proportional	  to	  the	  change	  
in	   inputs.	   Different	   types	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   returns	   to	   scale	   can	   be	   achieved	   by	   changing	   the	  
constraint .	   If is	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  from	  the	   formula	  we	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  have	  a	  constant	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returns	   to	   scale	   technology.	   If we	   allow	   non-­‐decreasing	   or	   non-­‐
increasing	  returns	  to	  scale,	  respectively.	  
Technical	  efficiency	  can	  be	  measured	  using	  either	  the	  input	  or	  output	  orientation.	  
Since	  firms	  in	  our	  study	  are	  micro	  and	  small	  businesses	  which	  are	  price	  takers,	  the	  
appropriate	  approach	  is	  the	  input-­‐oriented	  technical	  efficiency.	  	  
Under	   the	   assumption	   of	   variable	   returns	   to	   scale	   production	   technology,	   the	  





Banker	   et	   al.	   (1984)	   combine	   definitions	   of	   technical	   efficiency	   and	   returns	   to	  
scale	   technology	   to	   split	   technical	   efficiency	   under	   constant	   returns	   to	   scale	  
(TE!"#)	   into	   scale	   efficiency	   (SE)	   and	   pure	   efficiency	   in	   variant	   returns	   to	   scale	  
(TE!"#)	  as	  follows:	  	  
TE!"#   =   TE!"# ∗ SE	  	  	   	   	   (4)  
When	   a	   firm	   operating	   at	  TE!"#,	   it	   achieves	   both	   technical	   and	   scale	   efficiency	  
and	  thus	  has	  the	  highest	  productivity	  level.	  	  
	  
	  
Analysing	  firm	  dynamics	  
Given	   the	   high	   heterogeneity	   of	   the	   informal	   sector,	   the	   paper	   uses	   the	   Cluster	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and	   factors	  associating	  with	   the	   transition.	  The	  objective	  of	  CA	   is	   to	   classify	   firms	  
into	   groups	  or	   clusters	   in	   such	   a	  manner	   that	   all	   observations	  within	   a	   group	  are	  
similar,	   while	   observations	   in	   different	   groups	   are	   differential	   based	   on	   the	  
Chebychev	   distance.	   In	   this	   research,	   we	   use	   the	   hierarchical	   method	   since	   the	  
number	   of	   clusters	   is	   unknown	   before	   the	   clustering	   procedure.	  We	   also	   choose	  
Ward's	   linkage	   to	   partition	   firms	   since	   this	   algorithm	   merges	   observations	   while	  
increasing	   the	   overall	   within-­‐cluster	   variance	   to	   the	   smallest	   degree	   (Mooi	   and	  
Sarstedt,	  2011).	  
3.2	  Data	  and	  variable	  measurement	  
3.2.1.	  Data	  	  
The	  paper	  investigates	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  informal	  sector	  in	  Vietnam	  by	  using	  the	  
data	  sets	  from	  the	  surveys	  on	  Small	  and	  Medium	  Enterprises	  (SMEs)	  in	  Vietnam	  in	  
2009	   and	   2011.	   Both	   surveys	   cover	   approximate	   2,500	   enterprises	   and	   are	  
implemented	   in	   10	   provinces	   which	   are	   distributed	   equally	   across	   regions	   and	  
rural/urban	  areas	  of	  Vietnam.	  The	  provinces	   include	  Hanoi,	  Phu	  Tho,	  Ha	  Tay,	   and	  
Hai	  Phong	   in	   the	  north,	  Nghe	  An,	  Quang	  Nam,	  Khanh	  Hoa	   in	   the	  centre,	  and	  Lam	  
Dong,	  Ho	  Chi	  Minh	  City,	  and	  Long	  An	  in	  the	  south.	  	  
The	  sample	  is	  stratified	  by	  ownership	  forms	  based	  on	  the	  list	  of	  formal	  enterprises	  
and	  an	  on-­‐site	   random	  selection	  of	   informal	  businesses	   (For	  more	   information	  on	  
the	  survey,	  see	  Rand	  and	  Torm,	  2012).	  Information	  collected	  by	  the	  surveys	  include	  
firms	   and	   entrepreneurs'	   characteristics,	   firms'	   production	   and	   performance,	   and	  
business	  environment.	  Table	  1	  presents	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  sample	  by	  ownership	  
types.	  	  
	   	   Table	  2	  Distribution	  of	  the	  sample	  by	  ownership	  types	  
	   2009	   2011	  
-­‐	  Household	  Businesses	   1,734	   1,640	  
-­‐	  Private	  company	   214	   203	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   2009	   2011	  
-­‐	  Partnership	  or	  Collective	   83	   71	  
-­‐	  Limited	  company	   531	   532	  
-­‐	  Other	  ownership	   97	   106	  
Total	   2,659	   2,552	  
	   	  	  Source:	  Authors'	  calculation	  using	  SMEs	  data	  in	  2009	  and	  2011.	  
3.2.2.	  Variable	  measurement	  
Informality	  index	  
More	  often,	  empirical	  studies	  use	  a	  basic	  statistical	  definition	  to	  define	  an	  informal	  
firm	   as	   not	   having	   business	   registration	   certificate	   (BRC)	   and	   sometimes	   without	  
paying	  social	  and	  health	  insurance.	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  informal	  sector	  may	  be	  over	  or	  
under-­‐estimated.	  For	   instance,	   in	  SME	  survey	  sample,	   if	  having	  BRC	  and	  Tax	  Code	  
(TC)	  is	  used	  to	  define	  a	  formal	  firm,	  other	  criteria	  of	  formality	  such	  as	  paying	  social	  
and	  health	  insurance	  and	  having	  accounting	  book	  are	  partially	  violated	  as	  indicated	  
in	  Figure	  1a.	  Among	  firms	  holding	  BRC	  and	  TC,	  only	  a	  quarter	  of	  them	  pay	  social	  and	  
health	   insurance	   and	   a	   half	   have	   accounting	   books.	   In	   this	   case,	   informality	   is	  
under-­‐estimated	   in	   comparison	   with	   the	   definition	   proposed	   by	   ICLS	   and	   ILO.	  
Contrarily	   if	   combining	   both	   'having	   BRC	   and	   TC'	   and	   'paying	   social	   and	   health	  
insurance',	   informality	   is	   over-­‐estimated	   because	   formality	   is	   bounded	   by	   the	  
smallest	  circle	  in	  this	  Figure.	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Figure	  1.	  Venn	  Diagrams	  showing	  correlation	  between	  criteria	  
	  
Source:	  Authors'	  calculation	  using	  SME	  data	  set	  2011	  
Note:	   The	   area	   of	   squares	   represent	   all	   SMEs	   while	   the	   area	   of	   circles	   describe	  
number	  of	  SMEs	  meeting	  one	  of	  the	  following	  conditions	  (i)	  holding	  BRC	  and	  TC;	  (ii)	  
paying	   social	   and	   health	   insurance;	   (iii)	   having	   accounting	   book;	   (iv)	   being	   non-­‐
household	  businesses;	  (v)	  having	  above	  10	  workers;	  (vi)	  having	  no	  unpaid	  workers.	  	  
By	  investigating	  the	  rest	  of	  Figure	  1,	  we	  find	  that	  formality	  criteria	  including	  paying	  
social	   and	   health	   insurance,	   employing	  more	   than	   10	  workers,	   having	   accounting	  
book,	   being	   non-­‐household	   business	   and	   having	   no	   unpaid	   workers	   are	   mainly	  
coincided	   each	   other	   (Figures	   1d,	   e,	   f).	   This	   visualisation	   suggests	   using	   the	  
informality	   index	  which	   is	  a	   combination	  of	  all	   formality	   criteria	  proposed	  by	   ICLS	  
and	  ILO.	  Therefore,	  we	  proceed	  to	  calculate	  the	  informality	  index	  using	  MCA.	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The	   index	   is	   set	   as	   the	   score	   on	   the	   first	   principal	   axis	   derived	   from	  many	   firms'	  
characteristics	  associated	  with	  different	  aspects	  of	  the	  informality.	  They	  include	  (i)	  
incompliance	   with	   government	   regulations	   (no	   BRC,	   no	   TC,	   employees	   without	  
social	   insurance,	   employees	   without	   social	   and	   health	   insurance,	   no	   accounting	  
books),	  (ii)	  firm's	  resource	  endowment	  (number	  of	  employees,	  unpaid	  workers)	  and	  
(iii)	   type	   of	   ownership	   (household	   businesses	   or	   not).	   These	   variables	   can	   be	   a	  
mixture	   of	   nominal	   and	   categorical	   data,	  which	   could	   be	   integrated	   via	   the	  MCA	  
method.	  Table	  2	  presents	  the	  description	  of	  variables	  used	  to	  define	  the	  nature	  of	  
informality.	  
Table	  3.	  Description	  of	  variables	  to	  define	  informality	  index	  
Percentage	  (%)	  of	  enterprises	   2009	   2011	  
	   	   	  
Have	  Tax	  Code	   65.63	   70.92	  
Have	  Business	  Registration	  Code	   67.32	   73.00	  
Pay	  Social	  Insurance	   19.37	   20.49	  
Pay	  Health	  Insurance	   19.33	   20.96	  
Have	  Accounting	  Book	   41.52	   39.30	  
Ownership	   	   	  
-­‐	  Household	  Businesses	   65.21	   64.26	  
-­‐	  Private	  company	   8.05	   7.95	  
-­‐	  Partnership	  or	  Collective	   3.12	   2.78	  
-­‐	  Limited	  company	   19.97	   20.85	  
-­‐	  Other	  ownership	   3.65	   4.15	  
	  
Full-­‐time	  workers	   	   	  
-­‐	  Under	  5	  workers	   42.16	   45.42	  
-­‐	  5	  to	  10	  workers	   28.21	   27.08	  
-­‐	  Above	  10	  workers	   29.64	   27.51	  
	  
Unpaid	  workers	   	   	  
-­‐	  No	  unpaid	  worker	   29.26	   30.53	  
-­‐	  1	  unpaid	  worker	   21.66	   22.02	  
-­‐	  2	  unpaid	  workers	   35.43	   35.70	  
-­‐	  3	  unpaid	  workers	   8.42	   7.29	  
-­‐	  4	  unpaid	  workers	   3.84	   3.17	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Percentage	  (%)	  of	  enterprises	   2009	   2011	  
-­‐	  5	  unpaid	  workers	   0.79	   0.82	  
-­‐	  From	  6	  unpaid	  workers	   0.60	   0.47	  
	   	   	  
Number	  of	  enterprises	   2,659	   2,552	  
Source:	  Authors'	  calculation	  using	  the	  2009,	  2011	  SME	  surveys	  
The	  Vietnamese	  regulations	  require	  a	  formal	  firm	  to	  have	  a	  BRC	  and	  TC.2	  However,	  
in	   fact,	   many	   firms	   operate	   with	   both	   BRC	   and	   TC,	   while	   others	   have	   BRC	   but	  
without	  TC3	  (Rand	  and	  Torm,	  2012).	  Therefore,	  the	  percentage	  of	  firms	  holding	  BRC	  
is	   greater	   than	   that	   of	   firms	   having	   TC	   (Table	   2).	   The	   sample	   is	   dominant	   by	  
household	   businesses	   (65	   per	   cent).	   	   Moreover,	   unpaid	   workers4 	  seem	   to	   be	  
popular	   among	   SMEs.	   Regarding	   social	   and	   health	   insurance,	   only	   19	   per	   cent	   of	  
businesses	   in	   2009	   pay	   social	   and	   health	   insurances	   for	   their	   employees	   and	   this	  
ratio	   increases	   to	   20	   per	   cent	   in	   2011.	   Out	   of	   the	   sample,	   39-­‐42	   per	   cent	   of	  
enterprises	  have	  accounting	  books.	  	  
The	  variances	  (eigenvalues)	  of	  the	  first	  five	  axes	  and	  their	  inertia	  rates	  are	  given	  in	  
Table	  3.	  The	  MCA	  result	  shows	  that	  the	  first	  dimension	  explains	  91-­‐92	  per	  cent	  of	  
the	  total	  variance	  (Table	  3).	  Therefore,	  the	  informality	  index	  is	  defined	  as	  scores	  of	  
the	  first	  dimension	  of	  MCA.	  	  
Table	  4.	  Dimensions	  in	  MCA	  	  
	   Dim1	   Dim2	   Dim3	   Dim4	   Dim5	  
2009	   	   	   	   	   	  
Eigen	  values	   0.34	   0.01	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	  
%	  inertia	  (variance)	   92.12	   1.77	   0.03	   0.00	   0.00	  
2011	   	   	   	   	   	  
Eigen	  values	   0.34	   0.01	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	  
%	  inertia	  (variance)	   91.16	   2.22	   0.03	   0.01	   0.00	  
	  	  Source:	  Authors'	  calculation	  using	  SME	  data	  sets	  in	  2009,	  2011	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	  Government	  Decree	  No.	  88/2006/ND-­‐CP	  dated	  August	  29,	  2006.	  
3	  This	   indicates	   that	   government	   officials	   would	   come	   to	   collect	   (usually	   on	   a	   monthly	   basis)	   a	  
lump-­‐sum	  tax/fee.	  
4	  Family	  members	  who	  tend	  to	  work	  for	  household	  businesses	  are	  usually	  unpaid.	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To	   test	   new	   informality	   index,	   we	   plot	   the	   principal	   coordinates	   of	   nominal	   and	  
categorical	   variables	   of	   the	   first	   two	   dimensions	   using	   the	   2011	   SME	   survey	   (see	  
Figure	  3).	  This	  figure	  shows	  that	  all	  informality	  criteria	  including	  no	  BRC	  and	  TC,	  no	  
social	  and	  health	   insurance,	  under	  five	  employees,	  at	   least	  one	  unpaid	  worker,	  no	  
accounting	   book,	   and	   household	   businesses	   are	   located	   on	   the	   right	   of	   the	   first	  
dimension	  with	  positive	  values.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  negative	  values	  of	  the	  first	  principal	  
axis	   represent	  well	   all	   conditions	  of	   formality:	  paying	   social	   and	  health	   insurance,	  
employing	   above	   10	   employees	   (with	   noting	   that	   the	   category	   “5-­‐10	   employees”	  
located	   close	   to	   zero),	   no	   unpaid	   workers,	   having	   account	   books,	   and	   non-­‐
household	  businesses.	  This	  visualisation	  suggests	  taking	  positive	  values	  of	  the	  first	  
principal	   axis	   as	   informality	   and	   negative	   values	   as	   formality.	   The	   results	   are	  
consistent	  and	  robust	  for	  both	  2009	  and	  2011	  (see	  Appendix	  1	  for	  MCA	  coordinate	  
plot	  for	  2009).	  	  
Figure	  2.	  MCA	  Coordinate	  Plot	  
	  
Source:	  Authors'	  calculation	  using	  the	  2011	  SME	  survey	  
Firm	  performance:	  technical	  and	  scale	  efficiency	  
The	   non-­‐parametric	   DEA	   is	   applied	   to	   estimate	   technical	   and	   scale	   efficiencies	   of	  
the	   sampled	   firms	   in	   2009	   and	   2011.	   The	   reason	   to	   use	   technical	   and	   scale	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efficiencies	  as	  indicators	  of	  a	  firm	  performance	  rather	  than	  total	  factor	  productivity	  
(TFP)	  is	  that	  when	  a	  firm	  operates	  optimally	  at	  both	  technical	  and	  scale	  efficiencies,	  
it	   definitely	   achieves	   the	   highest	   level	   of	   productivity	   and	   thus	   TFP	   (Coelli	   et	   al.,	  
1998).	  Moreover,	  scale	  efficiency	   is	  a	  good	  measure	  for	  a	   firm	  performance	  when	  
the	  firm	  operates	  under	  variant	  returns	  to	  scale	  technology.	  	  
By	   imposing	   the	   restriction	   on	   	   𝛾!! ,	   the	   non-­‐parametric	   DEA	   calculates	   a	   firm	  
technical	  efficiency	  under	  both	  constant	  and	  variant	   return	   to	  scales	  and	  splits	   its	  
into	  technical	  and	  scale	  efficiencies	  using	  equation	  (4).	  Summaries	  of	  technical	  and	  
scale	  efficiencies	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  firms	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  4.	  	  
Table	  5.	  Technical	  and	  scale	  efficiencies	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  firms	  









Formal	  firms	   0.54	   0.86	   0.61	   0.86	  
Informal	  firms	   0.57	   0.68	   0.55	   0.69	  
Total	   0.56	   0.75	   0.57	   0.76	  
Source:	  Authors'	  calculation	  using	  data	  set	  from	  SME	  survey	  in	  2009&11.	  
As	   can	   be	   seen	   from	   Table	   4,	   while	   technical	   efficiency	   is	   not	   much	   different	  
between	   formal	   and	   informal	   businesses,	   scale	   efficiency	   of	   formal	   firms	   is	  much	  
higher	  than	  that	  of	  informal	  counterparts.	  The	  results	  imply	  that	  formal	  enterprises	  
are	  more	  optimal	  at	  scale	  operation	  than	  informal	  businesses.	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IV.	  DYNAMICS	  OF	  THE	  INFORMAL	  SECTOR	  
Using	  the	  balanced	  panel	  of	  1,774	  firms	  in	  each	  year,	  we	  start	  our	  discussion	  of	  the	  
main	  variable	  of	  interest,	   i.e.,	  the	  formality	  incidence.	  Based	  on	  results	  from	  MCA,	  
we	  define	  a	  formal	  firm	  if	  its	  informality	  index	  is	  negative	  and	  informal	  if	  the	  index	  
is	   positive.	   Table	   6	   documents	   the	   formal-­‐informal	   status	   and	   dynamics	   of	   firms	  
during	  the	  period	  2009-­‐11.	  
Table	  6.	  Informal-­‐formal	  status	  during	  2009-­‐11	  
	  
2011	  
	  2009	   Formal	   Informal	   Total	  














Total	   651	  (37)	   1,123	   (63)	  1,774	  
Source:	  Authors'	  calculation	  using	  SME	  data	  2009-­‐11	  
Note:	  	  Entries	  are	  the	  numbers	  of	  enterprises	  (percentage	  are	  in	  parentheses)	  
As	   can	   be	   seen	   from	   Table	   6,	   informal	   businesses	   are	   over-­‐represented	   in	   both	  
years	  and	  experience	  a	  slightly	  increasing	  trend	  during	  the	  period	  2009-­‐11	  (61%	  and	  
63%	   in	   2009	   and	   2011,	   respectively).	   This	   period	   also	   witnesses	   a	   dominant	  
transition	  from	  formal	  to	  informal	  status	  (10%	  versus	  3%	  that	  move	  in	  the	  opposite	  
direction).	  	  
To	  find	  out	  the	  reasons	  why	  informality	  has	  an	  increasing	  tendency	  while	  business	  
environment	   is	  more	   improved	   overtime,	  we	   use	   the	   cluster	   analysis	  method.	   As	  
suggested	   in	   the	   literature,	   characteristics	   of	   entrepreneurs	   and	   firms,	   firm	  
performance	   and	   policy	   environment	   are	   among	   the	   determinants	   of	   informality	  
level.	   They	   are	   selected	   as	   input	   variables	   for	   CA.	   Table	   7	   presents	   summary	  
statistics	  of	  variables	  included	  in	  CA.	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Table	  7.	  Summary	  statistics	  of	  variables	  used	  in	  cluster	  analysis	  
Variables	   Summary	   Variables	   Summary	  
1.	  Characteristics	  of	  entrepreneurs	   	   4.	  Policy	  environment	   	  
Sex	  (number)	   	   Constraints	  in	  2009	   	  
Male	  	   1,108	   No	  constraint	  	   300	  
Female	  	   666	   Capital	  constraint	  	   554	  
Age	  (mean)	   46.60	   Labour	  constraint	  	   46	  
Education	  (number)	   	   Technical	  constraint	  	   72	  
Not	  finished	  primary	  	   31	   Market	  constraint	  	   509	  
Finished	  secondary	  	   650	   Outside	  service	  constraint	  	   101	  
Finished	  high	  school	  	   1,093	   Land	  constraint	  	   135	  
Technical	  skill	  (number)	   	   Policy	  constraint	  	   45	  
Unskilled	   121	   Constraints	  in	  2011	   	  
Elementary	  worker	  	   92	   No	  constraint	  	   303	  
Technical	  worker	  	   1,121	   Capital	  constraint	  	   661	  
College	  and	  above	  	   440	   Labour	  constraint	  	   85	  
Social	  capital	   1,269	   Technical	  constraint	  	   63	  
2.	  Characteristics	  of	  firms	   	   Market	  constraint	  	   439	  
Firm	  age	  (mean)	   14.11	   Outside	  service	  constraint	  	   73	  
Have	  electronic	  access	  (%)	   35.79	   Land	  constraint	  	   83	  
3.	  Firm	  performance	  and	  dynamics	   	   Policy	  constraint	  	   41	  
Expansion	  and	  innovation	  in	  2009	  
(%)	  
57.72	   5.	  Government	  assistance	  and	  
regulations	  (%)	  
	  
Expansion	  and	  innovation	  in	  2011	  
(%)	  




	   Having	  financial	  assistance	  in	  
2009	  
10.59	  
Technical	  efficiency	  in	  2009	  
0.56	   Having	  technical	  assistance	  in	  
2011	  	  
2.93	  
Technical	  efficiency	  in	  2011	  
0.57	   Having	  technical	  assistance	  in	  
2011	  	  
3.55	  
Scale	  efficiency	  in	  2009	  
0.75	   %	  of	  management	  time	  
dealing	  with	  government	  
regulations	  in	  2009	  	  
1.11	  
Scale	  efficiency	  in	  2011	  
0.76	   %	  of	  management	  time	  
dealing	  with	  government	  
regulations	  in	  2011	  	  
2.35	  
Source:	  Authors'	  calculation	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To	  cluster	  firms,	  the	  Ward's	  linkage	  cluster	  analysis	  assigns	  observations	  into	  more	  
homogenous	   groups	   based	   on	   selected	   variables	   for	   the	   analysis.	   To	   decide	   the	  
number	   of	   clusters,	   we	   refer	   to	   dendrogram	   and	   Duda_Hart	   index.	   While	   the	  
dendrogram	   gives	   a	   somewhat	   arbitrary	   solution	   (Mooi	   and	   Sarstedt,	   2011),	  
Duda_Hart	   rule	   provides	   a	  more	   scientific	   selection	  with	   large	   Je(2)/Je(1)	   indexes	  
and	  smaller	  pseudo_T_squared	  values	  indicating	  more	  distinct	  clustering	  (Duda	  and	  
Hart,	   1973).	   The	   dendrogram	   and	   Duda_Hart	   indexes	   give	   the	   solution	   of	   four	  
clusters	   for	   the	   studied	   sample	   (see	   Appendix	   2	   for	   more	   explanations	   of	   the	  
solution).	  	  
Validation	  tests	  are	  also	  provided	  to	  check	  whether	  clusters	  are	  distinct	   from	  one	  
another.	   Table	   8	   documents	   Sidak	   post-­‐hoc	   for	   pair-­‐group	   comparison	   after	   one-­‐
way	   ANOVA	   for	   quantitative	   variables	   while	   Table	   9	   reflects	   Chi-­‐squared	   test	   for	  
categorical	  variables.	  
Table	  8.	  ANOVA	  and	  Sidak	  post-­‐hoc	  for	  pair-­‐group	  comparison	  
	   ANOVA	   Cluster	  1	   Cluster	  2	   Cluster	  3	   Cluster	  
Entrepreneur	  age	   ***	   ***	   	   	   2	  
	   	   ***	   ***	   	   3	  
	   	   ***	   ***	   ***	   4	  
Firm	  age	   ***	   ***	   	   	   2	  
	   	   ***	   ***	   	   3	  
	   	   ***	   ***	   ***	   4	  
Technical	  efficiency	  2009	   	   	   	   	   2	  
	   	   	   	   	   3	  
	   	   	   	   	   4	  
Scale	  efficiency	  2009	   ***	   **	   	   	   2	  
	   	   	   *	   	   3	  
	   	   	   ***	   	   4	  
Technical	  efficiency	  2011	   ***	   	   	   	   2	  
	   	   	   **	   	   3	  
	   	   ***	   	   ***	   4	  
Scale	  efficiency	  2011	   ***	   ***	   	   	   2	  
	   	   	   ***	   	   3	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   ANOVA	   Cluster	  1	   Cluster	  2	   Cluster	  3	   Cluster	  
	   	   ***	   	   ***	   4	  
%	   of	   management	   time	  
dealing	   with	   regulations	  
2009	  
***	   ***	   	   	   2	  
	   	   	   **	   	   3	  
	   	   *	   *	   	   4	  
%	   of	   management	   time	  
dealing	   with	   regulations	  
2011	  
***	   ***	   	   	   2	  
	   	   	   ***	   	   3	  
	   	   ***	   ***	   	   4	  
Note:	  '***'	  '**'	  '*"	  are	  statistically	  significant	  at	  1%,	  5%,	  and	  10%,	  respectively.	  





1.	  Characteristics	  of	  entrepreneurs	  
	  
4.	  Policy	  environment	  
	  Sex	   ***	   Constraints	  in	  2009	   ***	  
Education	   ***	   Constraints	  in	  2011	   ***	  
Technical	  skill	   ***	   Financial	  assistance	  in	  2009	  
	  Social	  capital	   ***	   Financial	  assistance	  in	  2011	  
	  2.	  Characteristics	  of	  firms	  
	  
Technical	  assistance	  in	  2009	   *	  
Electronic	  access	   ***	  
Technical	   assistance	   in	  
2011	   ***	  
3.	  Firm	  performance	  and	  dynamics	  
	  
Being	  inspected	  in	  2009	   ***	  
Informal-­‐formal	  transition	   ***	   Being	  inspected	  in	  2011	   **	  
Expansion	  and	  innovation	  in	  2009	   ***	  
	   	  Expansion	  and	  innovation	  in	  2011	   ***	  
	   	  Note:	   +:	  S.L:	  significant	  level.	  	  
	   '***'	  '**'	  '*"	  are	  statistically	  significant	  at	  1%,	  5%,	  and	  10%,	  respectively.	  
Results	   from	  ANOVA	  and	  Chi-­‐squared	   tests	   show	   that	   all	   variables	   included	   in	  CA	  
are	  meaningful	  and	  4	  clusters	  are	  distinct	  from	  one	  another.	  We,	  then,	  proceed	  to	  
the	  interpretation	  of	  clusters.	  Table	  10provides	  streamlined	  information	  on	  cluster	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characteristics.5It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   number	   of	   observations	   reduces	   to	  
1,765	  because	  some	  missing	  values	  are	  removed	  from	  the	  sample.	  
Table	  10.	  Characteristics	  of	  clusters	  
	  
Group	  1	   Group	  2	   Group	  3	   Group	  4	   Total	  
Number	  of	  observation	   441	   392	   97	   835	   1,765	  
Percentage	   25%	   22%	   5%	   47%	   100%	  
1.	  Characteristics	  of	  entrepreneurs	  and	  firms	  
Age	  of	  entrepreneurs	  (mean)	   56.44	   50.88	   59.32	   37.90	   46.59	  
Age	  of	  firms	  (mean)	   18.50	   9.02	   40.84	   10.97	   14.06	  
3.	  Firm	  performance	  and	  dynamics	  
	   	   	   	   	  Informal-­‐formal	  transition	  
	   	   	   	   	  Stayed	  as	  informal	   72.8%	   48.5%	   70.1%	   55.5%	   59.0%	  
Formal	   21.3%	   43.9%	   27.8%	   39.2%	   35.1%	  
Moving	  from	  informal	  to	  formal	   1.6%	   1.5%	   0.0%	   2.2%	   1.8%	  
Moving	  from	  formal	  to	  informal	   4.3%	   6.1%	   2.1%	   3.2%	   4.1%	  
Efficiency	  (mean)	  
	   	   	   	   	  Technical	  efficiency	  2009	   0.55	   0.56	   0.55	   0.55	   0.55	  
Technical	  efficiency	  2011	   0.55	   0.58	   0.50	   0.59	   0.57	  
Scale	  efficiency	  2009	   0.74	   0.80	   0.72	   0.74	   0.75	  
Scale	  efficiency	  2011	   0.72	   0.79	   0.67	   0.78	   0.76	  
4.	  Policy	  environment	  
	   	   	   	   	  Constraints	  in	  2009	  
	   	   	   	   	  No	  constraint	   25%	   23%	   8%	   43%	   100%	  
Capital	  constraint	   20%	   20%	   4%	   56%	   100%	  
Labour	  constraint	   24%	   20%	   2%	   54%	   100%	  
Technical	  constraint	   28%	   11%	   7%	   54%	   100%	  
Market	  constraint	   30%	   25%	   6%	   40%	   100%	  
Outside	  service	  constraint	   29%	   25%	   4%	   43%	   100%	  
Land	  constraint	   19%	   28%	   3%	   49%	   100%	  
Policy	  constraint	   40%	   11%	   13%	   36%	   100%	  
Constraints	  in	  2011	  
	   	   	   	   	  No	  constraint	   37%	   14%	   10%	   39%	   100%	  
Capital	  constraint	   20%	   21%	   4%	   54%	   100%	  
Labour	  constraint	   32%	   22%	   4%	   42%	   100%	  
Technical	  constraint	   30%	   21%	   3%	   46%	   100%	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5A	  full	  table	  of	  Cluster	  Analysis	  is	  provided	  upond	  request.	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Group	  1	   Group	  2	   Group	  3	   Group	  4	   Total	  
Number	  of	  observation	   441	   392	   97	   835	   1,765	  
Percentage	   25%	   22%	   5%	   47%	   100%	  
Market	  constraint	   24%	   27%	   4%	   45%	   100%	  
Outside	  service	  constraint	   26%	   25%	   5%	   44%	   100%	  
Land	  constraint	   17%	   34%	   6%	   43%	   100%	  
Policy	  constraint	   20%	   17%	   10%	   54%	   100%	  
%	   of	   management	   time	   dealing	   with	  
government	   regulations	   in	   2009	  
(mean)	   0.92%	   1.35%	   0.92%	   1.13%	   1.12%	  
%	   of	   management	   time	   dealing	   with	  
government	   regulations	   in	   2011	  
(mean)	   1.75%	   3.15%	   1.82%	   2.36%	   2.36%	  
Source:	  Authors'	  calculation	  
Cluster	  1–Informal	  and	  moving	   from	   formal	   to	   informal	   status.	  Compared	  to	  the	  
average	   level,	   this	   group	   is	   over-­‐represented	   by	   informal	   businesses	   (72.8%)	   and	  
those	  moving	  from	  formal	  to	  informal	  status	  (4.3%).	  Firms	  in	  this	  group	  run	  by	  old	  
entrepreneurs	  aged	  of	  56	  on	  average.	  This	  might	  be	  in	  line	  with	  the	  literature	  that	  
old	   people	   prefer	   self-­‐employment	   than	   salaried	   work	   (Marcouiller	   et	   al.,	   1997).	  
Moreover,	   runners	   of	   informal	   businesses	   have	   lower	   education,	   technical	   skills,	  
and	  social	  capital	  than	  their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  formal	  sector.	  This	  may	  support	  for	  
the	  argument	  that	  old	  and	   low	  educated	  people	  have	  trouble	  finding	  a	  waged	  job	  
(Cunningham	  and	  Maloney,	  2001).	  Firms	  in	  this	  group	  are	  among	  the	  second	  lowest	  
technical	  and	  scale	  efficiency	  level.	  The	  group	  has	  little	  opportunity	  to	  expand	  and	  
innovate.	  The	  most	  constraint	   faced	  by	   this	  group	   is	  policy	  constraint	   followed	  by	  
technical	  and	  market	  constraints.	  Firms	   in	   this	  group	  report	   the	   least	   intervention	  
by	  regulations	   (0.92%	  and	  1.75%	  of	  management	  working	  time	   in	  2009	  and	  2011,	  
respectively).	  	  
Cluster	  2–Formal	  and	  moving	  from	  formal	  to	  informal.	  This	  group	  is	  representative	  
by	  both	  formal	  firms	  (43.9%)	  and	  businesses	  moving	  from	  formal	  to	  informal	  status	  
(6.1%).	   Although	   run	   by	   old	   people	  with	   average	   age	   of	   51	   years	   old,	   this	   group	  
includes	  the	  youngest	  businesses	  aged	  9	  years	  old.	  Firms	  in	  this	  group	  achieve	  the	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highest	  technical	  and	  scale	  efficiency	  compared	  to	  the	  sample	  average	   level.	  Land	  
and	   market	   constraints	   are	   the	   most	   obstacles	   facing	   by	   this	   group.	   Technical	  
constraint	   is	   not	   cited	   because	   firms	   in	   this	   group	   often	   get	   technical	   assistance	  
from	   the	   government	   (35%	   and	   38%	   in	   2009	   and	   2011,	   respectively).	   The	  
hypothesis	  that	  formal	  firms	  suffer	  regulation	  burdens	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  avoid	  this	  
burden	  by	  moving	  to	  informal	  status	  seem	  to	  be	  correct	  for	  the	  case	  of	  Vietnam	  as	  
firms	  in	  this	  cluster	  are	  the	  most	  interfered	  by	  government	  regulations	  (1.35%	  and	  
3.15%	  of	  management	  working	  time	  in	  2009	  and	  2011,	  respectively).	  
Cluster	  3	  –	  Informal	  and	  vulnerable.	  This	  group	  is	  the	  smallest	  one,	  comprising	  5%	  
of	   the	   whole	   sample.	   Firms	   in	   this	   group	   are	   old,	   run	   by	   the	   oldest	   and	   low	  
educated	  people.	  The	  group	  has	  the	  lowest	  efficiency	  level.	  Furthermore,	  the	  policy	  
constraint	   is	  cited	  as	   the	  most	   important	  obstacle	  by	   firms	   in	   this	  group.	   It	   seems	  
that	  this	  cluster	  is	  composed	  of	  people	  who	  have	  no	  choice	  rather	  than	  being	  self-­‐
employees.	  The	  group	  is	   ignored	  by	  the	  government	  as	   it	  receives	  no	  government	  
assistance	  as	  well	  as	  interventions.	  	  
Cluster	  4	  –	  Formal	  and	  moving	  from	  informal	  to	  formal.	  This	  group	  includes	  formal	  
firms	  and	  those	  which	  move	  from	  informal	  to	  formal.	  Firms	  in	  this	  group	  are	  young	  
and	  run	  by	  the	  youngest	  entrepreneurs	  with	  high	   level	  of	  education	  and	  technical	  
skills.	   This	   might	   be	   because	   the	   business	   environment	   in	   Vietnam	   is	   less	  
constrained	   to	   the	  new-­‐enters.	   The	  group	   is	   characterised	  by	  modern	  enterprises	  
with	  high	  electronic	  access.	  Firms	  in	  this	  cluster	  achieve	  high	  level	  of	  efficiency	  and	  
have	   more	   opportunities	   to	   grow.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   reasonable	   when	   firms	   in	   this	  
group	  often	  cite	  capital,	  labour,	  and	  technical	  as	  the	  most	  constraints.	  Being	  formal	  
is	   accompanied	  with	   regulation	   interventions	   because	   52%	   of	   firms	   in	   this	   group	  
state	  that	  they	  are	  inspected	  in	  2011	  compared	  to	  47%	  of	  the	  sample	  average.	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V.	  POLICY	  DISCUSSION	  AND	  CONCLUSION	  
Informality	   is	   a	   complex	   concept	   which	   is	   unable	   to	   be	   well	   captured	   by	   some	  
criteria	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  statistical	  measure.	  Therefore,	  this	  paper	  calculates	  the	  
informality	  index	  by	  using	  the	  multiple	  correspondence	  analysis	  to	  combine	  a	  set	  of	  
variables	  indicating	  the	  informal	  status	  in	  the	  data	  set	  of	  SMEs	  in	  Vietnam	  in	  2009	  
and	  2011.	  Non-­‐parametric	  data	  envelopment	  analysis	  is,	  then,	  applied	  to	  estimate	  a	  
firm	  technical	  and	  scale	  efficiencies	  that	  are	  investigated	  as	  factors	  associating	  the	  
transition	  from	  informal	  to	  formal	  status	  and	  vice	  versa.	  	  
By	  clustering	   firms	   into	  different	  segments,	  hypotheses	  about	   informality	  seem	  to	  
be	  correct	  for	  the	  case	  of	  Vietnam.	  Firstly,	  we	  find	  that	   informal	  status	   is	  the	  only	  
option	  for	  small	  and	  vulnerable	  businesses	  because	  they	  have	  no	  capacity	  to	  grow	  
and	  move	  to	   formal	  condition.	  Government	  policy	  nearly	   ignores	   this	  group.	  With	  
the	  objective	  of	  helping	  people	  to	  get	  out	  of	  poverty	  sustainably,	   the	  government	  
should	  release	  policies	  which	  constrain	  the	  existence	  and	  growth	  of	  firms	  and	  pay	  
attention	  on	  technical	  assistance	  for	  firms	  in	  this	  group.	  
The	  paper	  also	  finds	  that	  firms	  moving	  from	  formal	  to	  informal	  status	  fall	  into	  two	  
categories.	   They	   may	   be	   weak	   firms	   that	   have	   no	   potential	   to	   expand	   and	   thus	  
choose	   informal	   status	   to	   escape	   formal	   cost	   burdens	   (cluster	   1)	   or	   strong	   firms	  
want	  to	  escape	  formal	  regulations	  (cluster	  2).	  Therefore,	  to	  impede	  the	  movement	  
from	   formal	   to	   informal	   condition,	   government	   policies	   should	   remove	   labour,	  
market,	  and	  technical	  constraints	  as	  well	  as	  policy	  interventions.	  	  
Findings	  from	  the	  paper	  reveal	  that	  formal	  firms	  and	  those	  moving	  from	  informal	  to	  
formal	   status	   are	   young	   and	   stronger	   enterprises	   run	   by	   capable	   entrepreneurs.	  
Benefits	   from	   formality	   such	   as	   providing	   more	   opportunities	   on	   receiving	  
government	   assistance	   encourage	   firms	  moving	   to	   formal	   status	   but	   government	  
regulations	  seem	  to	   interfere	  too	  much	  with	  this	  group.	  The	  expansion	  of	   firms	   in	  
this	  group	  needs	  more	  human	  and	  capital	  resources	  as	  well	  as	  technical	  assistance	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from	   the	   government.	   Therefore,	   pro-­‐formalisation	   policies	   should	   focus	   on	   loan	  
program	  and	  training	  skilled	  workers	  and	  technical	  know-­‐how	  for	  firms.	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APPENDIX	  
	  
APPENDIX	  	  1.	  MCA	  COORDINATE	  PLOTS	  
	  
	  





APPENDIX	  	  2.	  SOLUTION	  OF	  CLUSTER	  ANALYSIS	  
A2a.	  Dendrogram	  	  
	  


































































Dendrogram for CL1 cluster analysis
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A2b.Duda_Hart	  indexes	  for	  SME	  clustering	  
+-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐+	  
#	  of	  clusters	  	   Je(2)/Je(1)	  	   pseudo	  T-­‐squared	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐+-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐+-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
1	  	  	  	   	   0.6492	  	  	   952.50	  	  
2	  	  	  	   	   0.6296	  	  	   545.95	  	  
3	  	  	  	   	   0.7164	  	   	  328.97	  	  
4	  	  	  	   	   0.7474	  	  	   281.58	  	  
5	  	  	  	   	   0.5808	  	  	   316.92	  	  
6	  	  	  	   	   0.7133	  	  	   214.26	  	  
7	  	  	  	   	   0.5245	  	  	   86.13	  	  
8	  	  	  	   	   0.7044	  	  	   114.13	  	  
9	  	  	  	   	   0.5281	  	  	   60.77	  	  
10	  	  	  	   	   0.8294	  	  	   80.25	  	  
11	  	  	  	   	   0.7434	  	  	   91.81	  	  
12	  	  	  	   	   0.7086	  	  	   70.32	  	  
13	  	  	  	   	   0.8012	  	  	   73.94	  	  	  	  
14	  	  	  	   	   0.6861	  	  	   98.81	  	  
15	  	  	  	   	   0.6705	  	  	   59.95	  	  
+-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐+	  	  	  	  
Source:	  Authors'	  calculation	  
The	  dendrogram	  provides	  a	  solution	  of	  either	  3,	  4,	  or	  6	  clusters.	  We,	  therefore,	  base	  
on	  the	  Duda_Hart	   index.	  Combining	  both	  Je(2)/Je(1)	   index	  and	  pseudo_T_squared	  
value,	   the	   solution	   of	   4	   clusters	   seem	   to	   overweight	   the	   other	   two	   solutions	   as	  
Je(2)/Je(1)	  index	  is	  the	  largest	  while	  pseudo_T_squared	  is	  the	  smallest	  ones.	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